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WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES: RECOVERY OF
INVESTMENT IN AND SOCIETY AND
COMPANIONSHIP OF A CHILD
Currie v. Fiting
375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W2d 611 (1965)
The parents of twenty-one year old Linda Kay Hopkins recovered dam-
ages for the loss of her society and companionship when she died as a result of
an automobile collision.1 The trial court awarded the parents 32,788.32
dollars even though they were not dependent on their daughter for contribu-
tions to the family income.2 Both parties appealed, and the supreme court,
following Wycko v. Gnodtke,3 affirmed the judgment for loss of society and
companionship but remanded on the grounds that the jury should have con-
sidered the cost of raising the child as an additional element of damages.
4
Wrongful death statutes may be classified into three categories with
reference to recovery for the loss of society and companionship of a child: 5
(1) statutes expressly allowing relief; 6 (2) statutes allowing damages which
are fair and just and under which jurisdictions have split in permitting
recovery; 7 and (3) statutes expressly limiting damages to pecuniary loss. 8
1 Currie v. Fiing, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965). The action was brought
under Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.2922 (1961).
2 Currie v. Fiing, supra note 1. The court awarded $3,147.14 funeral expenses,
$1,000 per year for the average life expectancy of the parents for loss of society and
companionship, and $3,131.18 interest from the time of the accident.
3 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960), 22 Ohio St. L.J. 442 (1961).
4 "In the search for the elements of a particular life a jury might consider expenses
of birth, of food, of clothing, of medicines, of instruction, of nurture, and shelter ....
Currie v. Fiting, supra note 1, at -, 134 N.W.2d at 616.
5 See generally Annot. 74 A.L.R. 11 (1931).
6 Hawaii Rev. Laws § 246-2 (1955); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-1904 (1964); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 41.090(a) (1963); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 331.04(4) (1958); Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 1-1066 (1957).
7 States which permit recovery for society and companionship: Wilson v. City &
County of San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 440, 235 P.2d 81 (1951); McEntyre v. Jones,
128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953), although not expressly allowing recovery for loss of
society, the court said, "'As matter of sentiment, life has no pecuniary value, but considered
with reference to the relations of deceased with others, it is capable of such estimate.'"
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 465, 263 P.2d at 315; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Floyd,
249 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1958) (privilege of having the deceased with them in the home was
an element which the jury could consider); City of Fairburn v. Clanton, 102 Ga. App.
556, 117 S.E.2d 197 (1960) (impliedy permits recovery by holding that dependency on
the child is no longer a condition precedent to the parent's recovery); Hayward v. Yost,
72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952) ; Roby v. Kansas City So. Ry., 130 La. 896, 58 So. 2d
701 (1912); Boroughs v. Oliver, 226 Miss. 609, 85 So. 2d 191 (1956); Spangler v. Helm's
New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959); Simons v. Kidd,
73 S.D. 368, 42 N.W.2d 307 (1950); Meads v. Dibblee, 10 Utah 2d 229, 350 P.2d 853
(1960); Anderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co., 92 Va. 687, 24 S.E. 269 (1896); Davis v. North
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Prior to 1960 the states in the third category uniformly refused to allow
a parent to recover for loss of society and companionship since it was thought
not to be a pecuniary loss; 9 but in that year the Michigan Supreme Court, in
Wycko v. Gnodtke,'0 supplemented the traditional measure of damages'1 by
holding that the loss of society sustained by a parent as a result of a child's
death was a pecuniary loss.
Since Wycko, a few states with statutes similar to Michigan's' 2 have
decided the same issue with varying results.13 Ohio and Illinois, instead of
expressly allowing recovery of the loss of society, have created a presumption
of a pecuniary loss when a close family relationship is disrupted by the loss of
a member.14 In applying this presumption, these states have experienced a
lack of uniformity, a problem which might be largely overcome by expressly
recognizing society and companionship as the loss being compensated. 15
Coast Transp. Co., 160 Wash. 576, 295 Pac. 921 (1931).
States refusing recovery for society and companionship: Hahn v. Moore, 127 Ind.
App. 149, 133 N.E.2d 900 (1956); Agricultural & Mechanical Ass'n v. State, 71 Md. 86,
18 AtI. 37 (1889); Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965); Liston v. Reynolds,
69 Mont. 480, 223 Pac. 507 (1924), held that the jury failed to heed an instruction not to
consider loss of companionship as an element of damage, but Mize v. Rocky Mountain
Bell Tel. Co., 30 Mont. 521, 100 Pac. 971 (1909), allowed companionship in the husband
and wife relationship; but see Henessey v. Burlington Transp. Co., 103 F. Supp. 660
(D. Mont. 1950), which allowed recovery for loss of society to a parent; Kalsow v. Grob,
61 NJ). 119, 237 N.W. 848 (1931); Steiskal v. Darrow, 55 N.D. 606, 215 N.W. 83 (1927);
National Tank Co. v. Scott, 191 Okla. 613, 130 P.2d 316 (1942) (limits recovery to
pecuniary loss and says society is not such a loss); Banker v. McLaughlin, 200 S.W.2d
699 (Tex. Ct. App. 1947).
8 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 21-909 (1947) (allows recovery for mental anguish of a parent
but implies no recovery for companionship by anyone other than a spouse); Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1959); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.2922 (1961); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 573.02 (Supp. 1964); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 2552 (1964); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-810 (1964);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:31-5 (1952); N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 132; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28.174
(1950); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2125.02 (Page 1954); Vt. Stat. Ann. fit. 14, § 1492(b)
(1958).
9 Nelson v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 104 Mich. 582, 62 N.W. 993 (1895); Tilley v.
Hudson River R.R., 24 N.Y. 471 (1862); Kennedy v. Byers, 107 Ohio St. 90, 104 N.E.
630 (1923). See also Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 US. 59 (1913).
10 Supra note 3.
11 The traditional measure was the "net present value, after deducting the probable
cost of rearing the child, of services which it was reasonably to be expected that the child
would have been capable of rendering to the parents." McCormick, Damages § 101, at 352
(1935). For a criticism of this method of "bloodless bookkeeping," see Wycko v. Gnodtke,
supra note 3.
12 See statutes cited at supra note 8.
13 Accord, Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); contra, Graf
v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Fornaro v. Jill Bros., 42 Misc. 2d 1031, 249
N.Y.S.2d 833 (1964).
14 Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958) ; Immel v. Richards, 154 Ohio
St. 52, 93 N.E.2d 474 (1950).
15 Carr, " Measuring Damages in the Family Context," 1962 U. Ill. L.F. 574, at 576
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Society and companionship, although not clearly defined by the cases, is
probably best described as a family interest.16 In order to measure the loss of
this interest which cannot be assessed exactly,17 the courts have admitted
evidence of the following factors: the number of children in the family,18
whether the family was close, 19 the age of the child,2 0 the age of the parents,
21
whether the child lived with the parents,22 and the disposition of the de-
ceased.23 The end result, however, is that each case must be decided on its
own facts and circumstances. 24
In Currie it was argued that since Linda was an adult there could be no
recovery by her parents for loss of society and companionship. 25 The fallacy
of this argument is demonstrated by the fact that the pecuniary value of the
society of a minor who has left his parents might well be less to the parents
states: "The presumption was originally created for application in cases where minor
children were killed and no proof of earning capacity could be shown. But today, even in
these cases, the courts do not apply the presumption uniformly."
16 Carr, supra note 15, at 574. See also Wycko v. Gnodtke, supra note 3, where the
court said: "[S]o an individual member of a family has a value to others as part of a
functioning social and economic unit. This value is the value of mutual society and protec-
tion, in a word companionship.' See Holder v. Key System, 88 Cal. App. 2d 925, 200 P.2d
98 (1948).
17 Wycko v. Gnodtke, supra note 3.
18 Reisig v. Klusendorf, 375 Mich. 519, 134 N.W.2d 634 (1965) (sole heir); Currie v.
Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965) (only child).
19 Parsons v. Easton, 184 Cal. 764, 195 Pac. 419 (1921); Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich.
440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965).
20 Cook v. Clay St. Hill R.R., 60 Cal. 604 (1882); Griott v. Gambin, 194 Cal. App.
2d 577, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1961).
21 Ure v. Maggio Bros. Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d 111, 89 P.2d 436 (1939).
22 Powers v. Sutherland Auto Stage Co., 190 Cal. 487, 213 Pac. 494 (1923); Munro
v. Pacific Coast Dredging Co., 84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 303 (1890); Griffey v. Pacific Elec.
Ry., 58 Cal. App. 509, 209 Pac. 45 (1922); Reisig v. Klusendorf, 375 Mich. 519, 134
N.W.2d 634 (1965) (unmarried adult son residing with his parents); Currie v. Fiting,
375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965) (daughter living at home when not at school);
Straub v. Schadeberg, 243 Wis. 257, 10 NAV.2d 146 (1943). The Straub case held that
even though the boy was in the custody of the mother, where the father and the boy were
friendly and the father had the right to see the boy, the father was allowed to recover for
the loss of his son's society.
23 Davis v. Tanner, 88 Cal. App. 67, 81, 262 Pac. 1106, 1112 (1927), held no error
for the trial judge to instruct that the jury might consider "the disposition of said Harvey
D. Davis as to whether it was kindly and affectionate or otherwise." See Gulf Ref. Co. v.
Miller, 153 Miss. 741, 749, 121 So. 482, 484 (1929), which held it was not error to show
that this "lovable" boy was "the pride of his father, the joy of his mother, the idol of his
sisters, and the boon companion of his brothers;" Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109 Utah 149, 166
P.2d 244 (1946) (affectionate). See also Beeson v. Green Mountain Gold Mining Co.,
57 Cal. 20 (1880): "We think that the social and domestic relations of the parties, their
kindly demeanor toward each other, the society, were ... circumstances ... for the jury
to take into consideration in estimating what damages would be just. . . 2" Id. at 39.
24 Griott v. Gambin, 194 Cal. App. 2d 577, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1961).
25 Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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than that of a child of twenty-one who has always lived with her parents. Age
should merely be a factor to be considered with others in assessing the amount
of the loss and not a factor that precludes recovery.26 Other circumstances
were present in Currie to show the existence of society and companionship 2 '
and the court properly allowed its recovery.
Currie was remanded because the trial court failed to consider the
parents' investment in the child as an element of damages.28 Loss of invest-
ment, a new element of wrongful death damages, was derived from the words
of Justice Smith in Wycko v. Gnodtke,2 9 and the Wycko court seems will-
ing to permit investment recovery along with recovery for loss of society and
companionship and loss of contributions under the traditional measure of
damages.30 There were two theories of compensation upon which the court
could have based the recovery of the parents' investment: (1) that the amount
of the parents' investment in the child was evidence of the replacement cost of
the child, or (2) that the pecuniary value of the child at the time of death
was best represented by the total amount of money expended by the parents
on the child from 'her birth to her death. Both theories were argued by the
plaintiff,3 ' but the court's opinion does not indicate which one was selected.
Under the replacement cost theory one must first determine whether the
child is to be replaced by an infant or by another child the same age. If
replacement is by an infant, then the measure of damages may be analogized
to that in cases involving the destruction of perennial crops,3 2 i.e., the cost of
raising the infant to the age of the deceased child plus the loss of contributions
sustained by the parents before the infant attains that age. Logically, under
this theory there should be no recovery for the loss of future society and
companionship of the deceased child as the new child will provide society to
26 "WV'hy age 21 should set up a magic barrier baffles understanding in view of the
total omission from the statute .... " Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, - , 134 N.W.2d
611, 615 (1965).
27 Linda Kay Hopkins (1) was an only child, (2) was loving and affectionate toward
her parents, (3) lived at home with her parents when not at school, and (4) was not
yet 22.
28 Currie v. Fifing, 375 Mich. 440, - , 134 N.W.2d 611, 616 (1965).
29 See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 339, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1960), where
justice Smith stated: "Just as with respect to a manufacturing plant or industrial
machine, value involves the costs of acquisition emplacement, upkeep, maintenance service,
repair, and renovation, so, in our context, we must consider the expenses of birth, of food,
of clothing, of medicines, of instruction, of nurture and shelter." See generally Weinstein,
"Jury Verdicts-Excessive or Inadequate," 39 Mich. S.BJ. 11 (1960); Comment, 54
Nw. U.L. Rev. 254 (1959).
30 The court stated: "Finally if, in some unusual situation, there is in truth, or
reasonably forthcoming, a wage-profit capability in the infant (an expectation of an excess
of wages over keep, the measure heretofore employed) the loss of such expectation should
not be disregarded as one of the pecuniary losses suffered." Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich.
331, 340, 105 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1960).
31 Brief for plaintiff, pp. 47-40, Currie v. Fiing, supra note 28.
32 McCormick, Damages § 126 (1935).
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the parents just as the deceased would have, although there may be recovery
for any difference in value of the society and companionship.
If the replacement is to be by a child of the same age as the deceased, the
cost of replacement is merely the adoption costs of the new child. The new
child can now provide both future contributions and future society and com-
panionship in place of the deceased, and thus the parents have suffered no loss
of these prospective benefits.
If the court adopted the second theory, the assumption must have been
that the pecuniary value of the child was the amount of money invested in her
by her parents up to the time of her death. Value, as used here, could not have
been a market value, but rather it must have been the value of the child to
her parents. The recovery under this theory may be analogized to the recovery
for the destruction of personal property where market value is, for some
reason, inappropriate, and an elastic notion of value to the owner is used.8 3
In those cases "evidence of the original cost to the plaintiff, of the amount
which it would cost to replace the property, together with evidence of the
extent and the time... of the loss or injury, would be pertinent to be con-
sidered."'34 The combined recovery of the investment, future contributions,
and future society and companionship cannot be justified under the second
compensation theory. This recovery would amount to allowing the parents the
entire present value of their investment while at the same time allowing them
to enjoy the prospective benefits of that investment.
Apparently the court was attempting to remedy the inadequacy of past
awards under the traditional measure of damages which allowed recovery of
little more than burial expenses in many cases and, thus, made it cheaper to
kill a child than to injure him.35 In order to achieve this objective, the court is
willing to permit the simultaneous recovery of investment, future society and
companionship, and future contributions. However, to allow parents to
recover their entire investment while at the same time allowing them to enjoy
the prospective benefits of that investment is to permit a double recovery. The
recovery of investment ought to be an alternate remedy to the recovery of
prospective benefits, i.e., the recovery of one ought to preclude the recovery of
the other. On either of the above investment theories the court's remand to
consider loss of investment appears inconsistent with its affirmance of the
judgment for the loss of society and companionship.
Query, however, whether instead of looking at the result as inconsistent
33 Id. § 45.
34 Id. § 45, at 171.
35 See Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mfich. 440, -, 134 N.W.2d 611, 612-13 (1965), where
the court said: "[T]his Court has steadily moved away from the proposition-from which
Justice Smith recoiled in that case-that the value of the life of a child or of any human
being is such that there can be a recovery for funeral expenses and nothing more." See
also Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich. 223, 76 N.W.2d 80 (1956). Although recovery of a
parents' investment will result in larger awards under either of the theories, it is obvious
that the death of a rich man's child will result in a greater recovery than the death of a
poor man's child.
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with the theory, it would be more in line with the intent of the court to look
only at the result and disregard the analogy it uses. It is true that the result
is inconsistent when analogized to the recovery of damages for loss of prop-
erty, but can Linda Kay Hopkins be analogized to a machine, perennial crops,
or any other piece of property? Is this court saying that lawyers ought to rid
themselves of the traditional ideas of valuation based on replacement cost or
recovery of investment? Is it saying that our society places values on
human life that forbid an analogy of human life to items of property?
If so, the court may also be saying that the measure of the value of the life of
a child to the parent is what it cost to get the child where she was at death
plus what she might have repaid her parents in love and affection and money
in the future. Such a theory represents a complete break from traditional legal
notions of damages and is sure to result in larger awards in Michigan as well
as other states which may adopt such a theory. The result represents liberality
in recovery of damages far beyond the recovery allowed even under statutes
considered to be much more liberal than Michigan's. 6
36 Of all the statutes discussed above [see notes 8-10 supraj, that of Michigan and
of states having similar statutes seem to be the most restrictive as to recovery of damages
for wrongful death, limiting it to pecuniary loss.
